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Abstract 
This paper explores the process of seeking compensation for occupational illness under a no-fault accident insurance 
scheme. It uses two case studies, the first of firefighters who attended afire at a chemical storage depot, the second of 
timbermi/1 workers who worked with pentachlorophenol. to illustrate how science can be used to deny compensation to 
sick and dying workers. The paper suggests that science can be eo-opted and used to support business and state 
interests against workers. and that this ideological support is increasingly hidden behind the development of 'objec-
tive' systems of assessing compensation claims. 
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New Zealand has, since 1974, had a no-fault response to 
adverse events that have been associated with injuries. 
Civil claims for damages arising from personal injury by 
accident were abolished and so employers could no longer 
be sued for workplace accidents. 
Not only is personal injury compensatable under the Act, 
whether suffered inside our outside the workplace, but 
also occupational diseases, or more specifically, disease 
due to the nature of a person's employment (Accident 
Compensation Commission 1976: 11 ). However, as there 
is no compensation for sickness arising from other causes, 
some mechanism must be found to differentiate sickness 
caused from something outside the workplace, and sick-
ness caused by something within the workplace. This be-
comes particularly important in what are known as gradual 
process claims, such as some cases of chemical poison-
ing where the cause may be disputed, and where eligibil-
ity criteria become important sites of dispute. 
The Law Commission (Law Commissio~ 1988:xi) argued 
that "for historical and pragmatic reasons, sickness 
incapacities were not included in the new comprehensive 
scheme". They go on to suggest that "clearly the demar-
cation is anomalous. It is the kind of situation wruch gives 
hard emphasis to what has been called the inequality of 
luck". This paper explores how thls inequality of luck 
impacts upon workers suffering from conditions, the cause 
of which is disputed. Attempts have been made to de-
velop objective criteria to judge eligibility, and science is 
seen as an adjudicator in these situations. The choices for 
scientists are to use a balance of probabilities approach 
when confronted with uncertainty, or to base eligibility 
upon certain proof of sickness caused by a worker's em-
ployment. 
The following case studies explore the assumptions be-
hmd the decision to pursue "certainty" as the acceptable 
criteria. Certainty is in quotes, as it will be seen that to 
find that sickness is related to non-work agents requires a 
much lower level of proof than to find sickness as caused 
by workplace events. In other words, there is a double 
standard employed, where science can be eo-opted to 
perpetuate injustices. 
The following case studies of workers making claims that 
their sickness was work-related- the case of the ICI frre-
fighters and the case of timbermill workers using pen-
tachlorophenol (PCP) - indicates some interesting paral-
lels in the working out of science-related health contro-
versies under a no-fault insurance system. These cases 
also show that there has been a movement over time where 
'objective' standards have been established so that dis-
putes over gradual process claims can be settled more 
quickly. Although the 'objective' standards are promoted 
as offering a fair assessment of claims in cases where there 
is uncertainty, these standards appear to actually remove 
the notion of assessment on the basis of a balance of prob-
abilities. In their stead, they reinforce a notion that claims 
can only be successful where they are firmly based on 
stringent standards of evidence. 
The ICI Fire 
The ICI frre took place at ICI's Riverview store in Mt 
Wellington on December 21, 1984. The New Zealand Fire 
Service extinguished the fire using complements of up to 
86 frrefighters. 141 frrefighters attended the actual ftre on 
that day, with a total of 340 being involved in the 
frrefighting and subsequent clean up of the site and the 
equipment used (Elias et al. 1990:1 ). Whilst the ftre was 
being fought firefighters began to complain of burning 
sensations on their feet and legs, and 34 frrefighters sus-
tained immediate injuries in the form of skill rashes. Long-
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tenn effects were also reported by the firefighters. By 
1990, 214 firefighters reported health problems, the ma-
jority with an onset since the ICI frre. Spouses of the frre-
men reported more problems with their partners health 
than the frremen concerned (Elias et al. 1990:23 ), possi-
bly indicating an under-reporting issue. 
The section of the warehouse that was destroyed by the 
frre contained an assortment of chemicals and the pack-
aging materials would combust to generate a range of toxic 
products that would be present in the smoke. The frre 
would have produced a wide range of virtually unidenti-
fiable by-products (New Zealand Fire Service Commis-
sion 1985:40), thus exposing the frrefighters to many res-
piratory and systemic irritants. Out of this range of toxic 
substances one gained most attention- dioxin. Dioxin may 
arise in the combustion of chlorine and can occur as a by-
product of 2-4-5 T (Glass 1985:9), and both of these prod-
ucts were stored at the warehouse. 
Following the a number of reports were completed, cul-
minating in the release of the Elias Commission report to 
the Minister of Health on the health consequences of the 
ICI fire in 1990. It was apparent that the firefighters suf-
fered from an array of symptoms (such as skin rashes, 
respiratory problems, concentration difficulties and so on), 
but relating symptoms to exposure to particular chemical 
was not a simple matter. One occupational physician noted 
that 'Because of the complex nature of pyrolysis it is 
seldom possible to identify one particular chemical as the 
cause of the symptom-complex ... which may develop 
among the exposed' (Glass 1985:7). In addition the bio-
logically active compound in the production of intoxica-
tion syndrome may be at such low concentrations that it 
may not be detectable by customary techniques. The Elias 
Commission in its final report ignored these difficulties 
as it dismissed chemical intoxication as a source of the 
firefighters· troubles in favour of a psychological expla-
nation. 
The Elias Commission appointed a medical practitioner 
to investigate the health of the frretighters and a psychiat-
ric specialist to provide a report on the psychiatric and 
psychological impact of the fire and its aftermath on frre-
fighters. An epidemiological study carried out by the Elias 
Commission showed that compared to a control group, 
ICI tiretighters had significantly higher self-reporting of 
health problems, poorer neuro-psychological tests. and a 
higher incidence of ongoing skin complaints and central 
nervous system symptoms (Elias et al. 1990:30). The 
Commission however saw major problems in such a study 
in terms of ascribing environmental causes of disease due 
to the long latent period, lack of exposure data. other con-
founding causes of any problems, recall bias, and prob-
lems of tinding normative controls. 
The Elias Commission report concluded that although the 
tiretighters ' symptoms were real and not imaginary, and 
although the firefighters suffered symptoms from expo-
sure to toxins at the time of the frre, the symptoms that the 
firefighters continued to experience were due to stress and 
anxiety and should improve with the alleviation of that 
anxiety (Elias et al. 1990:9). The Commission concluded 
that ' there is no known toxicological justification• for an 
explanation of chronic skin or central nervous system 
symptoms experienced by firefighters following the ICI 
frre (Elias et al. 1990:97). Thus the Commission based its 
fmdings on the notion that there was not enough informa-
tion available to confrrm or deny this hypothesis, there-
fore it was rejected. 
In contrast to the dismissal of chemical toxicity as a cause 
of the frrefighters' symptoms, the Elias Commission ac-
cepted the psychiatrist 's report, despite its low level of 
rigour. The psychiatrist 's report criticises an academic 
ecologist and Greenpeace for their role in creating anxi-
ety. It highlights the problems of a diagnosis of neuro-
toxicity and the lack of international standards for such 
tests. It looks at past studies which concluded that fear 
and anxiety may have contributed to symptoms in other 
cases where symptoms developed after handling chemi-
cals. It takes a very small study involving 11 Australians 
diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder as support-
ing evidence for the relative unirnportance of the stress-
ful event as compared to prior psychological problems. 
Parsons 'sick role ' is utilised to provide a concept that 
explains the frrefighters problems, and other studies are 
cited which concluded that 'disability following a work-
ing accident was primarily motivated by fmancial gain' 
(Elias et al. 1990:280). Reports are cited which Link frre-
fighters ' health problems to levels of stress that they ex-
perience. The psychiatrist finds of great interest an inci-
dent of a frre involving pesticides, herbicides and insecti-
cides where no firemen were hurt! (Elias et al. 1990:285). 
Therefore the conclusion is that the symptoms are a result 
of 'chronic and unfortunate stress ' (Elias et al. 1990:291 ). 
It is on the basis of these loosely associated ideas that the 
Elias Commission drew their conclusion. 
In their recommendations to deal with the 'anxiety ' suf-
fered by the frrefighters, the Elias Commission proposed 
an extension of the activities of the occupational health 
service and that a way should be found to distance this 
service from management as firefighters were not mak-
ing much use of it. The occupational health service should 
'provide education in skin hygiene and treatment' to those 
frrefighters who continued to suffer skin rashes (Elias et 
al. 1990:1 09). Psychological counselling should be pro-
vided to all of those frretighters who seek it for the effects 
of stress. It also proposed that all frrefighters should un-
dergo a number of medical tests at regular intervals. 
These recommendations meant that the frretighters were 
to be increasingly subjected to medical surveillance that 
could lead to frrefighters losing employment due to medi-
cal criteria. This outcome parallels Turner's Foucauldian 
analysis of lobbying for safety legislation by workers in 
the mining industry. In that particular instance tbe lobby-
ing meant increasing losses of autonomy by the workers, 
and as safety legislation failed this led to further legisla-
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lion that increased the power of management (Turner 
1989). Nelkin and Tancredi argue that there are incen-
tives to test for the 'hypersusceptible' individual in the 
workplace, as there would be no need to change the 
workplace to make it safer - but attempt to identify and 
exclude the workers most susceptible (Nelkin and Tancredi 
1994). The influence of this type of argument can be seen 
in the Elias Commission report. where firefighters were 
constructed as overly anxious individuals and in need of 
better hygiene regimes. 
What this case illustrates is that criterion for accepting a 
particular agent as causal is flexible. In reality cause could 
derive from anxiety, from chemical A, B C, from dioxin, 
or from any series of interactions between these. But the 
standard of proof had to be that of certainty if the state 
was to pay out, but a lower Level of certainty was used to 
diagnose anxiety as the cause of frreftghters ' problems. 
In essence. there are elaborate mechanisms that give the 
semblance of rigorous analysis in order produce an out-
come that was favourable to all except the victims of in-
jury. 
PCP and Timbermill Workers 
There are many similarities between the frrefighters case 
and the following case study of timbermill workers. One 
significant difference is that by the 1990s new 'objective ' 
criteria had been developed to assess cases of possible 
occupational illness. The following case illustrates how 
these 'objective' criteria may also reinforce injustices. 
Pentachorophenol (PCP) was extensively used in 
timbermills in New Zealand from the 1960s to 1988, al-
though by the 1940s experimental evidence started to ac-
cumulate about its toxicity to humans. It was mainly used 
as an antisapstain agent in the treatment of radiata pine. 
Sapstain is a fungal agent that infects freshly sawn tim-
ber. Over a 40 year period an estimated 5000 tonnes of 
PCP were used, making New Zealand amongst the heavi-
est per capita users of PCP in the world (Stevenson 1992), 
although it ceased being used in Sawmills from 1988. 
Growing local and international concerns over PCP con-
tamination led to the chemical being de-registered for sale 
in New Zeal<\Qd in December 1991 , 
Sawmill workers were exposed to PCP particularly when 
timber was graded and sorted Many of the workers suf-
fered a variety of ill health effects which they later be-
lieved were related to PCP exposure, the Wood indus-
tries Union registering 400 such workers. PCP contami-
nation can cause an array of symptoms including fever, 
fatigue, weight loss, nausea and mood swings (Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Service 1996). Commercial or 
technical grades of PCP used in New Zealand also con-
tained toxic impurities created during manufacture, in-
cluding dioxins and furans (Bingham 1992). 
In December 1990 a National Task Group (NTG) was set 
up which reponed on potentially contaminated sawmill 
and timber treatment sites (National Task Group 1992). 
The Group's task was to assess the extent of PCP con-
taminated sites and advise government and industry on 
policies concerning liability, standards and clean-up. The 
NTG found that there were approximately 400 timbennill 
sites where PCP was used. 
In tenns of workers who might be affected by PCP, the 
NTG report stated that even full scale epidemiological 
studies would be unlikely to distinguish cases of chemi-
cal exposure from symptoms arising from such things as 
Lifestyle and consumption behaviour impacts, hereditary 
conditions, and exposure to chemicals outside of the 
workplace. Obstacles to achieving scientific validation for 
the workers' complaints were immense and include the 
fact that it cost $NZ 1500 to measure dioxin levels in one 
individual. The procedure of taking one litre of blood re-
quired to measure dioxin can be too stressful for sick 
workers. Many of the sickest workers have already died, 
possibly eliminating the most seriously contaminated from 
any study. Even if high blood dioxin levels are found, this 
does not establish that the dioxin causes the symptoms. 
To complicate the picture further, dioxin may not be caus-
ing their problems - some other chemical or combination/ 
interaction of chemicals may be the culprit. Current sci-
entific techniques may not be able to establish cause in 
these situations. 
As with the ICI frre, the dispute over the cause of the 
workers' health problems is a clash between the ' balance 
of probabilities ' approach and the ' beyond all reasonable 
doubt's approach (Jacques 1992:40). The National Task 
Group adhered to very strict definitions of scientific stand-
ards of certainty and proof, as opposed to looking at the 
balance of evidence. This was in part an outcome of its 
brief, which was to minimise the risks of further exposure 
to PCP. The NTG was not able to take up issues that were 
the domain of other departments, such as the Ministry of 
Health or the ACC. However, the point here is that when 
it comes to dealing with the workers ' health, the principle 
adhered to has been the ' beyond all doubt' approach. If 
scientific validation is the sole criteria of legitimation, it 
can be an insurmountable obstacle for workers and others 
hoping to gain legitimation for their complaints (Dew 
1999). 
A later report commissioned by the Labour Minister found 
that 137 fonner timber workers had an association be-
tween exposure and symptoms known to be short-tenn 
effects of PCP (Occupational Safety and Health Service 
1996; Walls et al. 1998 ). The study was not able to make 
any analysis of workers who had died or of associations 
between PCP and rare fatal illnesses such as cancer. This 
study did however identify low, medium and high expo-
sure groups, and found a significant dose-response rela-
tionship between past exposure to PCP and reponed symp-
toms of fever/ sweating, weight loss, persisting fatigue, 
nausea and neurophysiological dysfunction (Walls et al. 
1998). This report also noted that timber treatment work-
ers were exposed to a number of other mixtures since the 
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1950s such as CAA (copper, chrome and arsenic solu-
tion). The report stated that more evidence was needed 
before stronger conclusions could be drawn, in particular 
because the 137 in the sample were voluntary and there-
fore not a representative sample. 
ln 1996, due to health concerns raised by workers at 
tirnbermill plants the Engineering, Printing and Manufac-
turing Union (EPMU) set up an exposure register. The 
purpose of this register was to identify exposed workers 
and assist them in making ACC claims (Bandaranayake 
et al. 1999). 
A survey in 1999 of the 79 workers on the register found 
that they experienced an array of conditions including 
mood swings, breathing difficulties, persistent headaches 
and memory difficulties. In addition. over a third suffered 
from c hronic diarrhoea, nausea and chronic d izziness. 
Three of the workers had cancer. Most of the workers 
suffered from a combination of symptoms (Bandaranayake 
et al. 1999). Many workers experienced symptoms at rela-
tive ly low levels of exposure to PCPs. The report found 
that 72% of the workers were unclear about how to make 
a claim to ACC for PCP related problems. 
The outcomes for the timbermill workers has not been a 
ministerial report as with the ICI fuefighters, but an ACC 
pane l of experts was set up after extensive lobbying by 
the Union. Instead of a Commission being set up to in-
vestigate PCP exposures, ACC developed a new assess-
ment mechanism for such ·gradual ' process claims. In the 
case of chemical poisoning, this meant workers alleging 
a c hemical relationship to their illness had to pass a ' test 
of poisoning '. 
With this test of poisoning, if workers scored nine or more 
points then they would be compensated. One element in 
the test of poisoning is that where symptoms can possibly 
be related to other sources, then they will not gain any 
·points' in the test for those symptoms. To illustrate, ACC 
may accept excessive s weating as specific to PCP poi-
soning if it has a peculiar smell and rots the clothes. A 
requirement is also that the workers have to be suffering 
from the symptoms on the day of examination by the panel. 
This pane l was set up l 0 years after PCP stopped being 
used. Some workers presented to ACC with excessive 
sweating that in the past had the required pec uliar smell 
and rotted clothes. but now no longer had these charac-
teristics. On this basis the excessive sweating symptoms 
would not accrue points. The test also awards points if a 
biological marker can be found for the alleged toxic agent, 
but ACC do not believe that any such biological markers 
of poisoning by PCP-dioxins exist. 
Of the 34 workers examined by the ACC panel, five were 
accepted for compensation. but none of the cancer suffer-
ers were. Of these five, so far only one has received an 
independence allowance, one has been granted medical 
expenses only. and the other three have yet to be informed 
of the ir entitlement. 
The test of poisoning has itself sparked debate. The test 
was developed by a working party from the Royal Aus-
tralasian College of Physicians on order to identify best 
practice for the assessment of whether a person's illness 
could be explained by chemical exposure at work (Gorman 
and Dryson 1998). This working party noted a number of 
problems faced by occupational health physicians. These 
include the lack of information about occupational and 
environmental toxins, and the laclf of information about 
the actual formulations. The working party also suggested 
that an 'objective' test of poisoning was required as diag-
noses of occupational illness can have adverse effects on 
patients, as ' the negative health effects, in part, are due to 
the profound aggravation of morbidity that often accom-
panies compensation' (Gorman and Dryson 1998, 35). 
In effect, this latter argument is a powerful rationale for 
moving away from a balance of probability approach in 
the assessment of chemical poisoning, and allows the au-
thors of the test of poisoning to be dismissive of cases 
that could never pass their test. However, this test of poi-
soning was not acceptable to all occupational health phy-
sicians. One argued that the test of poisoning only worked 
in those cases where evidence-based measures of toxicity 
exist, and therefore this makes the formula unnecessary. 
He argued that the formula does not work for cases like 
PCP exposure, and he is • alarmed to see this formula, 
which has not been validated, being used by ACC or in-
surance companies to decline possible occupational dis-
ease claims' (Walls 1998). 
Discussion 
These two examples give us some interesting insights into 
the interactions that occur between the state, insurance 
and science. A lowering of the threshold for proof would 
provoke the fear that there would be an excessive burden 
on the funds of the compensation scheme. This conflicts 
with employers' concerns about minimising the premi-
ums they pay and the state's desire to reduce the costs of 
business activity. Consequently, a state-insurance scheme 
greeted as ground breaking and as a workers friend, does, 
in instances where science cannot give absolute proof, 
seriously disadvantage victims of industrial sickness. 
This relates to two different approaches to the burden of 
proof. In some jurisdictions, such as Ontario, Canada, 
work factors are assumed to cause disease unless proved 
otherwise. In others. such as the UK and New Zealand, it 
is assumed that the disease is not due to work factors un-
less proved otherwise, and the standard of proof is set 
very high (Watterson 1999). 
A significant change between the two case studies should 
also be noted. With the ' test of poisoning' established as 
the c riterion of assessment there in no longer a need to 
attempt to prove the cause of the illness. All that is re-
quired is to accept or reject the hypothesis that a particu-
lar chemical agent caused the illness. In the event of a 
rejection of this hypothesis nothing more needs to be done. 
With the ICI fuefighters, the Commission was set up to 
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establish cause, deciding that anxiety was the cause of the 
symptoms experienced. In oJ'der to establish anxiety the 
Commission could be accused of failing the double stand-
ard test (Martin 1997:30). That is, upon examination it is 
clear that the standards of proof set for identifying anxi-
ety as a cause were very low, whereas the standards of 
proof were very high for establishing chemical poisoning 
as causative of symptoms. With the establishment of the 
test of poisoning, such double standards can no longer be 
exposed. 
The convergence of state and business interests to mini-
mise the cost of accident insurance is made particularly 
easy when occupational disease is constructed by biomedi-
cal discourse as arising from one causative agent (Daykin 
1999). The difficulty in establishing cause can easily lead 
to diseases being discounted. 
Of note in these two cases are similar constructions of 
workers seeking compensation. The test of poisoning 
working party explicitly states that diagnoses of occupa-
tional disease, where such diseases are compensatable, 
have adverse health effects. The psychiatrist's report on 
the I Cl firefighters had as a basic assumption that claims 
for compensation are explicitly motivated by financial 
gain. It ap~ars that the movement away from a balance 
of probability approach in determining disease causation, 
and a diagnosis of anxiety in favour of occupational ill-
ness, are based on notions of the power of the placebo 
and the malingering worker. This comes at the expense of 
workers with genuine illness. Judgements about the ma-
lingering worker conceal social and class prejudices, and 
where the issue of worker compensation is raised these 
concerns about malingering are heightened (Dembe 1998). 
As Daykin (1999: 7) notes 'decisions about such issues 
as occupational exposure levels and threshold limit val-
ues reflect value judgements about acceptable levels of 
risk and not just the rational application of scientific in-
formation '. Such value judgements, as in these case stud-
ies, frequently serve the interests of employers, even in a 
no-fault compensation environment where punitive dam-
ages would not accrue to employers. 
Although it now seems unlikely that the ftrefighters will 
receive any compensation for their suffering, this is not 
necessarily the case for the tirnbermill workers. Despite 
the failure to pass the 'test of poisoning' the Union repre-
senting the workers is still lobbying for some form of in-
quiry into the issue. Comparison with other cases of chemi-
cal poisoning illustrates that the efforts to receive com-
pensation can take decades. For example, the compensa-
tion for victims of what is considered the worst episode 
of poisoning in Europe, the contaminated rapeseed case 
· in Spain where approximately 500 people died, took 18 
years to resolve (Bosch 1999: 1975). The cases of methyl 
mercury poisoning in Minamata (Thurston 1974) and of 
asbestos ill-effects (Calhoun and Hiller 1988) suggest that, 
even after decades of lobbying, claims may still be suc-
cessful. 
Future Research 
These case studies are of cases where there has been ac-
tive lobbying on the behalf of workers to bring the issue 
to the attention of ACC and other authorities. There is 
little research that has looked at the way workers react to 
signs and symptoms of illness and injury in the workplace. 
Qualitative studies exploring workers' responses to their 
working environments, and delineating the sort of issues 
that confront workers when they deal with workplace haz-
ards (from keyboards to radioactive material!) would pro-
vide a fuller understanding of workplace illness and in-
jury. 
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